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Abstract
The order and lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic comple-
ments do not survive a minimal introduction of strategic substitutes: in a lattice game
in which all-but-one players exhibit strategic complements (with one player exhibit-
ing strict strategic complements), and the remaining player exhibits strict strategic
substitutes, no two equilibria are comparable. More generally, in a lattice game, if
either (1) just one player has strict strategic complements and another player has
strict strategic substitutes, or (2) just one player has strict strategic substitutes and
has singleton-valued best-responses, then without any restrictions on the strategic
interaction among the other players, no two equilibria are comparable. In such cases,
the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique
equilibrium. Moreover, in such cases, with linearly ordered strategy spaces, the game
has at most one symmetric equilibrium. Several examples are presented.
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Games with strategic complements (GSC) and games with strategic substitutes (GSS)
formalize two basic economic interactions and have widespread applications.1 In GSC,
best-response of each player is weakly increasing (or non-decreasing) in actions of the
other players, and in GSS, best-response of each player is weakly decreasing (or non-
increasing) in the actions of the other players.2
As is well-known, in GSC, the equilibrium set has nice order and structure proper-
ties: there always exist a smallest and a largest equilibrium,3 and more generally, the
equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice.4 These properties have proved useful
in several ways; for example, they help to provide simple and intuitive algorithms to
compute equilibria, and they help to show monotone comparative statics of equilibria
in such games.
In contrast, in GSS, the equilibrium set is completely unordered – no two equilibria
1Such games are deﬁned in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), and as they show, models
of strategic investment, entry deterrence, technological innovation, dumping in international trade,
natural resource extraction, business portfolio selection, and others can be viewed in a more unifying
framework according as the variables under consideration are strategic complements or strategic
substitutes. Earlier developments are provided in Topkis (1978) and Topkis (1979).
2Versions of such games arise in diverse economic environments, including competitive strategy,
public goods, industrial organization, natural resource utilization, manufacturing analysis, team
management, tournaments, resourceallocation, business portfolio development, principal-agent mod-
eling, multi-lateral contracting, auctions, technological innovation, behavioral economics, and others.
3Various versions of this result can be seen in Topkis (1978), Topkis (1979), Lippman, Mamer, and
McCardle (1987), Sobel (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Shannon
(1994), Echenique (2004), among others. For additional developments, confer Echenique (2002),
Quah (2007), and Quah and Strulovici (2009).
4See Zhou (1994).
1are comparable (in the standard product order).5 Consequently, in such games, with
multiple equilibria, techniques based on the complete lattice structure of the equilib-
rium set, or the existence of a smallest or largest equilibrium are invalid. Typically,
diﬀerent techniques are required to analyze such games.
The existing results show that when we move from a setting where all players
exhibit strategic complements to a setting where all players exhibit strategic substi-
tutes, the order structure of the equilibrium set is destroyed completely. A central
motivation for the present analysis is to inquire when and by how much the order
structure of the equilibrium set is aﬀected as we move player-by-player from a setting
of all players with strategic complements to a setting of all players with strategic
substitutes.
The new results here show that the nice order and structure properties of GSC
do not survive a minimal introduction of strategic substitutes, in the following sense.
Consider a lattice game6 in which all-but-one players exhibit strategic complements
(with one player exhibiting strict strategic complements7), and the remaining player
exhibits strict strategic substitutes.8 In this case, no two equilibria in the game are
comparable (in the product order).
The results shown here are stronger, and apply to lattice games with more general
strategic interaction among the players. In particular, in any lattice game, if there is
reason to believe that either (1) just one player has strict strategic complements and
5See Roy and Sabarwal (2008).
6Intuitively, a lattice game is a strategic game in which every player’s strategy set is a complete
lattice, and every player’s payoﬀ function is continuous in own variable. No restriction is placed on
strategic interaction across other players. The formal deﬁnition is given in the next section.
7Intuitively, best response is strictly increasing in other player strategies.
8Intuitively, best response is strictly decreasing in other player strategies.
2another player has strict strategic substitutes, or (2) just one player has strict strategic
substitutes and has singleton-valued best-responses, then without any restrictions
on the strategic interaction among the other players, we may conclude that no two
equilibria are comparable. We present several standard examples (extended matching
pennies, Cournot duopoly with spillovers, and Dove-Hawk-type game) to highlight
these results.9
These results have several implications.
First, in such cases, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and
only if, the game has a unique equilibrium. In other words, with multiple equilibria,
an important component (the order structure of the equilibrium set) underlying the
justiﬁably celebrated theory of games with strategic complements does not survive a
simple extension of the theory to include other realistic cases.10 Therefore, there is a
need to develop new techniques to study additional cases of interest.
Second, in such cases, with multiple equilibria, techniques based on the existence
of a smallest or largest equilibrium are invalid. In particular, with multiple equilibria,
the standard technique of using extremal equilibria to show monotone comparative
statics in GSC is invalid for the cases considered here. (In ongoing work, we show
9Games that have both strategic complements and strategic substitutes arise naturally in many
applications: from the simple textbook game of matching pennies, to several examples from compet-
itive strategy and industrial organization in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), to games
with contests in Dixit (1987), among others. Therefore, the results here have implications for a wide
variety of applications.
10A quick calculation shows that in 2×2 games, with uniformly distributed payoﬀs, the probability
of a GSC is 1/4, and the probability of a game having one player with strict strategic substitutes is
3/4. With more players and actions, the probability of drawing a game that falls under the cases
considered here may very well be larger.
3that under conditions similar to those here, in parametrized lattice games, equilibria
do not decrease as the parameter increases. Moreover, using new techniques, we have
some preliminary results that provide conditions under which monotone comparative
statics is guaranteed.)
Third, the non-ordered nature of equilibria show that starting from one equi-
librium, algorithms to compute another equilibrium may be made more eﬃcient by
discarding two areas of the action space.
Fourth, if player strategy spaces are linearly ordered, then the set of symmetric
equilibria is non-empty, if, and only if, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, in such cases, there is at most one symmetric equilibrium.
The proofs here are simple and are not meant to be a methodological contribu-
tion. Some of the simplicity arises naturally in many analyses of questions related
to strategic complements and strategic substitutes. Some of it arises from the re-
cent resurgence of work in strategic substitutes that has provided valuable insights
regarding similarities and diﬀerences between GSC and GSS.11 And some of it arises
from a new insight into fundamental relations underlying the order structure of the
equilibrium set in the presence of strategic substitutes.
The results here are related to Roy and Sabarwal (2008), but cover cases of interest
that cannot be covered in their framework. In particular, a central case in this
paper, where all-but-one players have strategic complements, is ruled out by their
11For some developments in this area, confer Amir (1996), Villas-Boas (1997), Amir and Lambson
(2000), Schipper (2003), Zimper (2007), Roy and Sabarwal (2008), Acemoglu and Jensen (2009),
Acemoglu and Jensen (2010), Jensen (2010), Roy and Sabarwal (2010), Roy and Sabarwal (2011),
among others.
4assumptions.12 Moreover, the proofs here are diﬀerent: they are simpler and rely
more directly on economic intuition.
We use the standard product order on the product of the player strategy spaces.
This is a natural and intuitive order to consider in lattice games, and is used widely
in GSC and in GSS. Recall that in the special case of a two-player GSS, reversing
the order on the strategy space of one player transforms that game into a GSC, and
results for a GSC apply to this special case. More generally, there may be no such
transformation that leaves the equilibrium set invariant. For example, the textbook
example of a two-player matching pennies game (a game with both complements and
substitutes) has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and therefore, cannot be viewed
as a GSC, because a GSC always has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Similarly,
Roy and Sabarwal (2011) provide an example of a three-player, two-action, Dove-
Hawk-type GSS that has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and therefore, cannot
be viewed as a GSC.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section, section 2, sets up the model,
section 3 proves the main results and provides several applications, and section 4
concludes.
12This implies that the basic building blocks of the interactions studied in this paper – two-player
games in which one player has strategic complements and another has strategic substitutes – are
ruled out by their assumptions. In fact, none of the applications in section 3 are covered by their
assumptions. Details are presented in the appendix.
52 Lattice Games
Let I be a non-empty set of players, and for each player i, a strategy space that is
a partially ordered set, denoted (Xi,￿i), and a real-valued payoﬀ function, denoted
fi(xi,x−i). As usual, the domain of each fi is the product of the strategy spaces,
(X,￿), endowed with the product order.13 The strategic game Γ = {I,(Xi,￿i,fi)i∈I}
is a lattice game if for every player i,
1. Xi is a non-empty, complete lattice,14 and
2. For every x−i, fi is order continuous in xi.15
The deﬁnition of a lattice game here is very general. In particular, no restriction
is placed on whether players have strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
Consequently, this deﬁnition allows for general games with strategic complements,
general games with strategic substitutes, and mixtures of the two.
This deﬁnition of a lattice game yields well-deﬁned best-responses, as follows. For
each player i, the best response of player i to x−i is denoted BRi(x−i), and
is given by argmaxxi∈Xi fi(xi,x−i). As the payoﬀ function is continuous, and the
strategy space is compact in the order interval topology, for every i, and for every
x−i, BRi(x−i) is non-empty. Let BR : X ￿ X, given by BR(x) = (BRi(x−i))i∈I,
denote the joint best-response correspondence. As usual, a (pure strategy)
Nash equilibrium of the game is a proﬁle of player actions x such that x ∈ BR(x).
13For notational convenience, we shall usually drop the index i from the notation for the partial
order.
14This paper uses standard lattice terminology. See, for example, Topkis (1998).
15In the standard order interval topology.
6The equilibrium set of the game is given by E = {x ∈ X|x ∈ BR(x)}.16
Of particular interest to us are cases where the best-response of a player is either
increasing (the case of strategic complements) or decreasing (the case of strategic
substitutes) with respect to the strategies of the other players. Here, increasing or
decreasing are with respect to an appropriately deﬁned set order.
Recall that in a lattice game, if the payoﬀ function of each player i is quasi-
supermodular in xi,17 and satisﬁes the single-crossing property in (xi;x−i),18 then
the best-response correspondence of each player is nondecreasing19 in the standard
induced set order.20 Such a game is termed a lattice game with strategic com-
16Needless to say, at this level of generality, a lattice game may have no Nash equilibrium. For
example, the textbook two-playermatching pennies game is admissible here, and has no pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Roy and Sabarwal (2011) provide an example of a three-player Dove-
Hawk-type game (a GSS) with no Nash equilibrium. One may assume additional conditions to
invoke standard results to guarantee existence of equilibrium via Brouwer-Schauder type theorems,
or Kakutani-Glicksberg-Ky Fan type theorems, or other types of results. We do not make these
assumptions so that our results apply whenever equilibrium exists, regardless of whether a speciﬁc
equilibrium existence theorem is invoked, or whether an equilibrium is shown to exist directly in a
game.
17As in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), a function f : X → R (where X is a lattice) is quasi-
supermodular if (1) f(x) ≥ f(x ∧ y) =⇒ f(x ∨ y) ≥ f(y), and (2) f(x) > f(x ∧ y) =⇒ f(x ∨ y) >
f(y).
18A function f : X × T → R (where X is a lattice and T is a partially ordered set) satisﬁes
single-crossing property in (x;t) if for every x0 ≺ x00 and t0 ≺ t00, (1) f(x0,t0) ≤ f(x00,t0) =⇒




−i) is weakly lower than BRi(x00
−i) in the induced set order. When a player’s






20The standard induced set order is deﬁned as follows: for non-empty subsets A,B of a lattice X,
A is weakly lower than B, if for every a ∈ A, and for every b ∈ B, a ∧ b ∈ A, and a ∨ b ∈ B. It is
7plements, or GSC, for short.
In a GSC, the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice (see Zhou (1994)),
and there exist a smallest equilibrium and a largest equilibrium (various versions
of this result can be seen in Topkis (1978), Topkis (1979), Lippman, Mamer, and
McCardle (1987), Sobel (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990), Milgrom
and Shannon (1994), among others).
Similarly, in a lattice game, if the payoﬀ function of each player i is quasi-
supermodular in xi, and satisﬁes the decreasing single-crossing property in (xi;x−i),21
then the best-response correspondence of each player is nonincreasing22 in the stan-
dard induced set order. Such a game is termed a lattice game with strategic
substitutes, or GSS, for short.
Notice that the case where a player’s best response is a constant function can be
viewed as either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Therefore, in a lattice
game with strategic complements, strategic substitutes may be introduced trivially
by having some players with constant best response functions. Of course, such games
remain lattice games with strategic complements, and the equilibrium set in such
games remains a non-empty, complete lattice.
sometimes also termed the strong set order.
21A function f : X × T → R (where X is a lattice and T is a partially ordered set) satisﬁes
decreasing single-crossing property in (x;t) if for every x0 ≺ x00 and t0 ≺ t00, (1) f(x00,t0) ≤




−i) is weakly lower than BRi(x0
−i) in the induced set order. When a






8For non-trivial results involving strategic substitutes, it is useful to consider players
with best responses that are “strictly” decreasing with respect to the strategies of the
other players. To formalize strict strategic substitutes, consider the following set
order. Let X be a lattice. For non-empty subsets A,B of X, A is strictly lower
than B, if for every a ∈ A, and for every b ∈ B, a ≺ b. This deﬁnition is a slight
strengthening of the following set order deﬁned in Shannon (1995): A is completely
lower than B, if for every a ∈ A, and for every b ∈ B, a ￿ b. Notice that when A
and B are non-empty, complete sub-lattices of X, A is strictly lower than B, if, and
only if, supA ≺ inf B; and similarly, A is completely lower than B, if, and only if,
supA ￿ inf B.
Strictly decreasing correspondences are deﬁned in a natural manner using the
strictly lower than set order. Let X be a lattice and T be a partially ordered set. A
correspondence φ : T ￿ X is strictly decreasing, if for every t0 ≺ t00, φ(t00) is strictly
lower than φ(t0). In particular, strictly decreasing correspondences that are singleton-
valued are equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of a strictly decreasing function.23
Similarly, we shall also ﬁnd it useful to deﬁne strictly increasing correspondences. A
correspondence φ : T ￿ X is strictly increasing, if for every t0 ≺ t00, φ(t0) is strictly
lower than φ(t00). When the correspondence is a function, this is equivalent to the
standard deﬁnition of a strictly increasing function.24
23t0 ≺ t00 ⇒ φ(t00) ≺ φ(t0).
24Recall that Shannon (1995) provides conditions on payoﬀ functions that guarantee a comparison
in the completely lower than set order. Moreover, in ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean spaces, Edlin and
Shannon (1998) provide an additional intuitive and easy-to-use diﬀerentiable condition regarding
strictly increasing marginal returns to derive a comparison in the strictly lower than set order. Both
these conditions can be adapted easily for strategic substitutes.
9With these ideas in place, player i has strict strategic substitutes, if BRi
is strictly decreasing, and player i has strict strategic complements, if BRi is
strictly increasing.
3 Results and Applications
This section provides the main results in this paper and provides several applications.
Theorem 1 shows that in any lattice game, one player with strict strategic substitutes
and one player with strict strategic complements are suﬃcient to destroy the order
structure of the equilibrium set, as follows.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a lattice game in which one player has strict strategic substitutes
and another player has strict strategic complements.
If x∗ and ˆ x are distinct equilibria, then x∗ and ˆ x are not comparable.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that player 1 has strict strategic substi-
tutes, player 2 has strict strategic complements, and suppose the distinct equilibria
are comparable, with ˆ x ≺ x∗.
As case 1, suppose ˆ x−1 ≺ x∗
−1. Then ˆ x1 = BR1(ˆ x−1) and x∗
1 = BR1(x∗
−1), and by
strict strategic substitutes, x∗
1 ≺ ˆ x1, contradicting ˆ x ≺ x∗.
As case 2, suppose ˆ x1 ≺ x∗
1. Then ˆ x−2 ≺ x∗
−2. Then ˆ x2 ∈ BR2(ˆ x−2) and x∗
2 ∈
BR2(x∗
−2), and by strict strategic complements, ˆ x2 ≺ x∗
2, whence ˆ x−1 ≺ x∗
−1, and we
are in case 1. Thus x∗ and ˆ x are not comparable.
Notice the simple economic intuition in this proof. In case 1 in the proof, if
opponents of player 1 play higher strategies in the x∗ equilibrium than in the ˆ x
10equilibrium, then player 1 (with strict strategic substitutes) must be playing a strictly
lower strategy in the x∗ equilibrium than in the ˆ x equilibrium, and therefore, the
equilibria are non-comparable. Case 2 essentially says that with ˆ x ≺ x∗, player
1 cannot be playing a higher strategy in the x∗ equilibrium. For if he did, then
player 2 (with strict strategic complements) is playing a higher strategy in the x∗
equilibrium, and therefore, the opponents of player 1 are playing higher strategies
in the x∗ equilibrium, whence player 1 is playing a strictly lower strategy in the x∗
equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
Notice that Roy and Sabarwal (2008) show similar results for the case where the
best-response correspondence satisﬁes a never-increasing property. Their property is
satisﬁed in lattice games in which every player has strict strategic substitutes, but it
rules out a central case in this paper: all-but-one players have strategic complements,
and the remaining player has strategic substitutes.25 In particular, none of the exam-
ples here are covered by their results. Moreover, the proofs here are diﬀerent; they
are simpler and rely more directly on economic intuition.
Let’s look at some applications of theorem 1.
Example 1 (Matching Pennies: Double-or-Nothing). Consider the following
extension of a standard matching pennies game. Each player has two pennies that
they lay on a table with their hand covering the pennies. Once the pennies are
revealed, the outcomes determine the payoﬀs as follows. Let’s say that a player goes
for double-or-nothing, if she plays either both heads or both tails, and she does not
25In fact, their property is not satisﬁed when all-but-one players have strategic complements, the
remaining player has at least two actions, and there are no restrictions on the strategic interaction
with the remaining player. Moreover, it is not satisﬁed even when these properties only hold locally.
Details are provided in the appendix.
11go for double-or-nothing, if she plays anything else. If the outcome is (H,H) and
(H,H), or (T,T) and (T,T), that is, both players go for double-or-nothing and the
pennies match, then player 2 wins $2 from player 1. If the outcome is (H,H);(T,T),
or (T,T);(H,H), that is, both player go for double-or-nothing and the pennies do not
match, then player 1 wins $2 from player 2. If both players put up exactly one H and
one T, that is, nobody goes for double-or-nothing, it is a tie and no money changes
hands; and if one player goes for double-or-nothing, that is, plays either (H,H) or
(T,T), and the other does not, (that is, plays (H,T) or (T,H),) then the player who
goes for double-or-nothing loses and pays $1 to the other player. The payoﬀs of this
zero-sum game are summarized in Figure 1.
(H, H) (T, H) (H, T) (T, T)
(H, H) -2, 2 -1, 1 -1, 1 2, -2
(T, H) 1, -1 0, 0 0, 0 1, -1
(H, T) 1, -1 0, 0 0, 0 1, -1










Figure 1: Matching Pennies: Double-or-Nothing
Assuming H ≺ T, and with the standard product order, the strategy space of each
player has the order (H,H) ≺ (H,T) ≺ (T,T); (H,H) ≺ (T,H) ≺ (T,T); and (T,H)
and (H,T) are not comparable. Notice that player 1 has strict strategic substitutes,
player 2 has strict strategic complements, and the four Nash equilibria (H,T;T,H),
(H,T;H,T), (T,H;T,H), and (T,H;H,T) are all non-comparable.
12A more general version of this example is presented next.
Example 2 (A general two-player, four-point lattice game). Consider a lattice
game with two players. Player 1’s strategy space is a standard four-point lattice,
X1 = {a1,b1,c1,d1}, with b1 and c1 unordered, and a1 = b1 ∧ c1, and d1 = b1 ∨ c1,
shown graphically in ﬁgure 2. Similarly, X2 = {a2,b2,c2,d2}, also shown graphically
in ﬁgure 2. Suppose player 1’s best response correspondence is given as follows:
BR1(a2) = {d1}, BR1(b2) = BR1(c2) = {b1,c1}, and BR1(d2) = {a1}, and player
2’s best response correspondence is given as follows: BR2(a1) = {a2}, BR2(b1) =
BR2(c1) = {b2,c2}, and BR2(d1) = {d2}. Both are depicted in ﬁgure 2. It is
easy to check that this example satisﬁes the conditions of theorem 1: player 1 has
strict strategic substitutes, player 2 has strict strategic complements. Consequently,
the four Nash equilibria (b1,b2), (b1,c2), (c1,b2), and (c1,c2) are all non-comparable.
(Notice that double-or-nothing matching pennies is a special case of this example.)
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c1  d1 
a2 b2 
c2 d2 















Figure 2: A General Two-Player, Four-Point Lattice Game
For completeness, observe that non-comparability of equilibria may hold with
conditions weaker than one player with strict strategic complements and one player
with strict strategic substitutes. The next application provides a two-player game
with weak strategic substitutes (that is, best response of each player is decreasing in
the completely lower than set order) and weak strategic complements (best response
13of each player is increasing in the completely lower than set order)26 that has non-
comparability of equilibria.
Example 3 (Matching Pennies: Double-or-Nothing, Part 2). Consider the
following modiﬁcation to the game of double-or-nothing matcing pennies. If both
players go for double-or-nothing and the pennies match (that is, the outcome is (H,H)
and (H,H), or (T,T) and (T,T)), player 2 wins $2 from player 1, and if both pennies
do not match (the outcome is (H,H);(T,T), or (T,T);(H,H)), player 1 wins $2 from
player 2. In all other cases, the game is a tie, and no money changes hands. The
payoﬀs of this zero-sum game are summarized in Figure 3.
(H, H) (T, H) (H, T) (T, T)
(H, H) -2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 2, -2
(T, H) 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(H, T) 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0










Figure 3: Matching Pennies: Double-or-Nothing, Part 2
Assume the same order structure as in double-or-nothing matching pennies. No-
tice that player 1 has weak strategic substitutes, player 2 has weak strategic comple-
ments, and the four Nash equilibria are all non-comparable.
The intuition behind theorem 1 can be taken further, in the sense that when the
best-response of the player with strict strategic substitutes is singleton-valued, the
26See the appendix for a formal deﬁnition
14requirement of a player with strict strategic complements can be dropped, as follows.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a lattice game in which one player has strict strategic substi-
tutes, and this player’s best-response is singleton-valued.
If x∗ and ˆ x are distinct equilibria, then x∗ and ˆ x are not comparable.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that player 1 has strict strategic substi-
tutes with singleton-valued best responses, and suppose the distinct equilibria ˆ x and
x∗ are comparable, with ˆ x ≺ x∗.
Case 1 remains the same as above. Suppose ˆ x−1 ≺ x∗
−1. Then ˆ x1 ∈ BR1(ˆ x−1) and
x∗
1 ∈ BR1(x∗
−1), and by strict strategic substitutes, x∗
1 ≺ ˆ x1, contradicting ˆ x ≺ x∗.
For case 2, suppose ˆ x−1 = x∗
−1 and ˆ x1 ≺ x∗
1. Then ˆ x1 = BR1(ˆ x−1) = BR2(x∗
−2) =
x∗
2, contradicting ˆ x1 ≺ x∗
1. Thus x∗ and ˆ x are not comparable.
Intuitively, in theorem 2, if ˆ x ≺ x∗, then we need only consider the case when the
opponents of player 1 play higher strategies; that is, ˆ x−1 ≺ x∗
−1. For if ˆ x−1 = x∗
−1,
then by singleton-valued best responses, the best response of player 1 to ˆ x−1 is the
same as her best response to x∗
−1, and thus both equilibria are the same, which is a
contradiction.
Theorem 2 formalizes the intuition that adding one player with strict strategic
substitutes completely destroys the order structure of the equilibrium set. Here’s an
application of theorem 2.
Example 4 (Cournot Duopoly with Spillovers). Consider two ﬁrms competing
as Cournot duopolists. Let the (inverse) market demand be given by p = a−b(x1+x2).
Firm 1 has constant marginal cost, c1; its proﬁt is given by π1(x1,x2) = (a − b(x1 +
x2))x1 − c1x1. Firm 1’s output leads to a (perhaps) non-monotonic cost spillover
15for ﬁrm 2, denoted s(x1), aﬀecting proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 as follows: π2(x1,x2) = (a −
b(x1 + x2))x2 − c2x2s(x1). Intuitively, we may view ﬁrm 1 as an established ﬁrm (or
incumbent), and ﬁrm 2 as a young ﬁrm (or a relatively new entrant). The young ﬁrm
receives cost externalities from the established ﬁrm, perhaps by making it easier to
get industry-speciﬁc talent, or having access to superior supply chain management
at a lower cost, and so on. Suppose a = 15,b = 1






2x1 + 3. This spillover function is non-negative and non-monotonic: as
ﬁrm 1’s output increases from 0 to 1+
√
2
2 ≈ 1.2, the spillover reduces from 3 to a local
minimum of about 2.1, and then starts to increase.
In this case, the best responses are given by BR1(x2) = max{4 − 1
2x2,0}, and
BR2(x1) = max{6 + x1 + 3x2
1 −2x3
1,0}. It is easy to check that there are three Nash
equilibria; given by (1
2,7), (2,4), and (4,0), and these are non-comparable, as shown
in ﬁgure 4.
Figure 4: Cournot Duopoly with Spillovers
16Theorem 2 shows that when the best-response of the player with strict strategic
substitutes is singleton-valued, the condition in theorem 1 regarding one player with
strict strategic complements can be dropped. Example 5 below shows that when the
best-response of the player with strict strategic substitutes is not singleton-valued,
this condition in theorem 1 cannot be dropped, in general.
Example 5 (A Dove-Hawk-type game). Consider the lattice game with two
players given in ﬁgure 5, where for player 1, L ≺ M ≺ H, and for player 2, L ≺
M. We may interpret L as a low (most Dovish, least Hawkish) action, M as a
medium (less Dovish, more Hawkish) action, and H as a high (or least Dovish, most
Hawkish) action. Player 1 has strict strategic subsitutes, with non-singleton-valued
best-response: BR1(L) = {M,H}, and BR1(M) = {L}. Player 2 is of a type
that prefers less conﬂict (or avoids agression, or would prefer a more “cooperative”
action). Player 2 exhibits “weak” strategic complements; in fact, player 2’s best-
response function is constant, BR2(L) = BR2(M) = BR2(H) = {L}. This game has
two Nash equilibria, (M,L) and (H,L), and these equilibria are comparable, with
(M,L) ≺ (H,L).
L M
L 0, 5 5, 0
M 5, 5 0, 0










Figure 5: A Dove-Hawk-type Game
Theorems 1 and 2 above highlight a particular non-robustness in the order struc-
17ture of the equilibrium set in lattice games.
If we consider a lattice game in which all players have strategic complements,
then the equilibrium set is a non-empty, complete lattice. In particular, every pair of
equilibria has a smallest larger equilibrium, and a largest smaller equilibrium.
If we modify this game to require that one player has strict strategic complements,
and another has strict strategic substitutes, then we destroy the order structure of
the equilibrium set completely. That is, no two equilibria are comparable.
Similarly, if we modify this game to require that one player has strict strate-
gic substitutes, and that player’s best-response is singleton-valued (perhaps because
that payoﬀ function is strictly quasi-concave), then again the order structure of the
equilibrium set is destroyed completely.
Of course, the results here are stronger, and apply to general lattice games, not
just to lattice games with strategic complements. In particular, in any lattice game,
if there is reason to believe that either (1) one player has strict strategic complements
and another player has strict strategic substitutes, or (2) just one player has strict
strategic substitutes and has singleton-valued best-responses, then without any re-
strictions on the strategic interaction among the other players, we may conclude that
no two equilibria are comparable.
Indeed, the results above yield the following corollary immediately.
Corollary 1. Let Γ satisfy the conditions of either theorem 1 or theorem 2. The
following are equivalent.
(1) E is a non-empty lattice
(2) E is a singleton
(3) E is a non-empty, complete lattice
18In other words, with multiple equilibria, an important component of the theory
of GSC does not survive a minimal extension of the theory to include other realistic
cases.
This result further implies that for the cases considered here, with multiple equilib-
ria, techniques based on the existence of a smallest or largest equilibrium are invalid.
In particular, the standard technique of using extremal equilibria to show monotone
comparative statics in GSS is invalid here.
Moreover, for such cases, the non-ordered nature of equilibria show that starting
from one equilibrium, algorithms to compute another equilibrium may be made more
eﬃcient by discarding two areas of the action space.
Furthermore, theorems 1 and 2 also imply immediately that when strategy spaces
of players are linearly ordered,27 the game has at most one symmetric equilibrium,28
as formalized next.
Corollary 2. Let Γ satisfy the conditions of either theorem 1 or theorem 2, and sup-
pose the strategy space of each player is linearly ordered.
The set of symmetric equilibria is non-empty, if, and only if, there is a unique sym-
metric equilibrium.
27As usual, linearly ordered means that every pair of strategies is comparable. A linear order is
sometimes termed a complete order.
28An equilibrium is symmetric, if every player plays the same strategy in equilibrium.
194 Conclusion
The results here show that an important component (the order structure of the equi-
librium set) underlying the justiﬁably celebrated theory of games with strategic com-
plements does not survive a simple extension of the theory to include other realistic
cases. These results show the necessity of developing new techniques to study im-
portant questions such as monotone comparative statics; they point out a way to
improve the eﬃciency of algorithms to compute equilibria; and they show that in
fairly general cases, lattice games have at most one symmetric equilibrium.
This paper is part of an ongoing project to extend the theory of GSC to include
additional realistic cases. Recent work in this area has developed new techniques
that may be fruitful. Our continuing work extends these results to show that under
conditions similar to those here, in parametrized lattice games, equilibria do not
decrease as the parameter increases. Moreover, using new techniques, we have some
preliminary results that provide conditions under which monotone comparative statics
is guaranteed.
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22Appendix
Roy and Sabarwal (2008) assume that the best-response correspondence satisﬁes a
never-increasing property, deﬁned as follows. Let X be a lattice and T be a partially
ordered set. A correspondence φ : T ￿ X is never increasing, if for every t0 ≺ t00,
for every x0 ∈ φ(t0), and for every x00 ∈ φ(t00), x0 6￿ x00.29 This property is satisﬁed in
lattice games in which every player has strict strategic substitutes, but it rules out
a central case in this paper: all-but-one players have strategic complements, and the
remaining player has strategic substitutes. To see this, consider the following.
Let X be a lattice and T be a partially ordered set. A correspondence φ : T ￿ X
is weakly completely increasing, if for every t0 ≺ t00, φ(t0) is completely lower than
φ(t00).30 Player i has weak strategic complements, if BRi is weakly completely
increasing.31 We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a lattice game in which all-but-one players exhibit weak
strategic complements, and the remaining player has at least two actions. The best
response correspondence in such a game does not satisfy the never-increasing property.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that all-but-player-1 have weak strategic
complements. Consider x0
1 ≺ x00
1 in X1, and x0














Then for each i 6= 1, x0
−i ≺ x00





−i) arbitrarily. By weak strategic complements, y0
i ￿ y00
i . Thus, (x0
1,x0
−1) ≺
29When best-responses are functions, this coincides with the deﬁnition of a not-increasing function,
t0 ≺ t00 ⇒ φ(t0) 6￿ φ(t00), and in linearly ordered X, this is equivalent to a strictly decreasing function.
30When the correspondence is a function, this is equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of a weakly
increasing function.
















contradicting the never-increasing property.
Consequently, the case where all-but-one players exhibit weak strategic comple-
ments, and the remaining player has strategic substitutes is not covered by Roy and
Sabarwal (2008). It is precisely this case that starts the analysis in this paper: con-
sider a movement away from the case of all strategic complements by introducing one
player with strategic substitutes.
It is easy to see that the global nature of the deﬁnition of a never-increasing cor-
respondence rules out more cases. In particular, a similar proof shows that cases
with local weak strategic complements for the remaining players do not satisfy the
never-increasing property. The Cournot duopoly with spillovers provides an intu-
itive example. In this case, player 2 does not have weak strategic complements.
Nevertheless, the best-response correspondence does not satisfy the never-increasing
property, because for example, for all ￿ > 0 suﬃciently small, (1
2,7) ≺ (1









2 +￿,7). This occurs, because
player 2 has weak strategic complements in a neighborhood of 1
2, even though he does
not have weak strategic complements globally.
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